

that Megrahi was acting at the behest of the Libyan government:

"The clear inference which we draw from this evidence is that the conception, planning and execution of the plot which led to the planting of the explosive device was of Libyan origin." (p.75)

"We accept the evidence that he was a member of the JSO, occupying posts of fairly high rank." (p. 80)

Since the verdict, the Bush administration has been firm in its insistence that Libya abide by the terms of the U.N. Security Council Resolutions, which call for Libya to accept responsibility for the bombing, and for payment of appropriate compensation to the families. The sanctions are rooted in the concept in international law that a government is responsible for the wrongful acts of its officials.

In a meeting with family members on February 8 of this year, Secretary of State Colin Powell was clear in detailing the Bush administration's policy:

"President Bush intends to keep the pressure on the Libyan leadership, pressure to fulfill the remaining requirements of the U.N. Security Council, including Libya's accepting responsibility for the actions of its officials and paying appropriate compensation."

The Bush administration has stated that the investigation into the Lockerbie bombing is still open. A \$5 million dollar award is still in place for information leading to the arrest and conviction of others involved in the bombing. State Department spokesman Richard Boucher said last month that the United States will follow the evidence "wherever it leads." Secretary Powell, in his meeting with the families, elaborated on this as well:

"However we resolve this and however we move forward from this point on, we reserve the right to continue to gather more evidence and to bring more charges and new indictments . . . So accepting responsibility as a leader of a nation, and as a nation, doesn't excuse other criminals who might come to the fore and be subject to indictment."

Unfortunately, there are others who have not supported the reasonable aims of the Security Council, the United States, and Great Britain. In an interview with *The Independent* on February 9 of this year, Nelson Mandela, who helped broker the agreement which persuaded Gaddafi to turn the suspects over for trial, accused the U.S. and Great Britain of having "moved the goalposts" on the issue of lifting sanctions.

"The condition that Gaddafi must accept responsibility for Lockerbie is totally unacceptable. As President for five years I know that my intelligence services many times didn't inform me before they took action. Sometimes I approved, sometime I reprimanded them. Unless it's clear that Gaddafi was involved in giving orders it's unfair to act on that basis.

I ask: is it really possible to believe that a Libyan intelligence agent would carry out a massive operation such as the downing of a passenger aircraft without approval from those higher up the chain of command?

Similarly, oil companies, some of whom I know are represented here today, have seen the verdict as the first step in resuming normal relations with Libya. Archie Dunham, the Chairman and Chief Executive of Conoco, stated last month that he was "very optimistic" that President Bush will lift the unilateral U.S. sanctions against Libya, in part because of the President and Vice President Cheney's ties to the Texas oil industry.

I find these efforts to promote business at the expense of justice to be deeply disturbing. I am afraid that comments such as those by Mr. Dunham and Mr. Mandela send a message that terrorists and the countries which sponsor or harbor them will not have to pay a significant price for their actions. When we allow ourselves to believe, as is a popular view now, that encouraging business relationships with countries such as Libya which carry out terrorist acts will somehow inoculate us against further terrorist attacks, I believe that we are dangerously naive. Is it really good business to do business with terrorists? Every corporation represented in this room today must ask if it is worth it to resume business in a country whose leader refuses to acknowledge his responsibility for the mass murder of 270 human beings. Anyone in this room could have easily had a loved one on Pan Am 103.

Where do we go from here? The government of Libya and Col. Gaddafi must accept responsibility for the bombing of Pan Am 103 and the murders of 270 people. The government of Libya must pay appropriate compensation to the families. The government of the United States must continue to pursue and develop information leading to the indictments, arrest, and conviction of the others responsible for the bombing. The world community must realize that lifting the sanctions against Libya before Libya has fully complied with them sends a signal that the civilized countries of the world are not serious about going after perpetrators of mass murder. The business community must know that sweeping Pan Am 103 under the rug will, ultimately, not be good for business. We must press for renewal of the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act which is due to expire in August. We must re-impose the U.N. sanctions if the Libyan government does not comply with the terms of the original sanctions. Support for these positions is embodied in a current Sense of Congress resolution which has bipartisan support.

Finally, I think it is vital for everyone to know that the Pan Am families will not go away. In a Reuters article dated February 13 of this year, Saad Djebbar, a London based lawyer who has advised the Libyan government was quoted as follows:

"The more the United States sticks to the original agreement that the aim of the process was the surrender and trial of the two accused, the more the Libyans will cooperate and compensate the families."

I interpret this to mean that if the families back off, the government of Libya will pay compensation to the families. This cynical approach dishonors the memories of our loved ones and we will never agree to it. Continuing to pursue what and who was behind the Lockerbie bombing and the acceptance of responsibility by the Libyan government are goals which will not be abandoned by the families.

Another British expert on Libya, George Joffe, was quoted in the same article as follows:

"Gaddafi knows he's going to have to pay compensation. The question is whether he can control the domestic agenda and curb his own tongue over the next few months, and whether extremists on the other side of the Atlantic among the families and their supporters in Congress can be kept under control."

The ultimate resolution of the rift between the United States and Libya does not hinge on whether Gaddafi can "keep his tongue." The ultimate resolution will come when the Libyan government meets its responsibil-

ities to the families and to the international community. As for the families and our supporters in Congress being "kept under control"—we have been invigorated by the verdict of the Scottish court, and we will not go away.

#### SWORD TO PLOUGHSHARES

Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I rise today to discuss some efforts in defense conversion that are reaping great gains. In the book, "The Idea of National Interest", Charles Beard wrote:

Government might legitimately take the initiative and pursue some interests aggressively. Furthermore, it might make use of its own citizens and their interests to advance the national interest.

Early on U.S. foreign policy for the Former Soviet Union, FSU, was designed to do just that: make use of U.S. citizens' interest to advance our national security objectives.

Today, I would like to briefly underscore some successes, specifically in the realm of defense conversion. Before doing so, however, I wanted to offer some insights regarding the scope of the problem.

First, the legacies of a command economy were prevalent in all nations behind the Iron Curtain. Such legacies included: a structure of production dominated by heavy industry, distorted factor and product prices, antiquated or obsolescent capital stock, inadequate skills to compete in a modern economy; a neglected infrastructure, severe environmental degradation, trade oriented towards other uncompetitive markets, and large volumes of non-performing loans and heavy foreign debt.

The FSU was no exception with respect to inheritance of these burdens and impediments. And despite all these similarities with other eastern European states, the FSU, especially Russia, was unique in one very important way.

For Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan "heavy industry" was that of defense. Fifty-two percent of Russia's industry was involved in military-related research, design and manufacturing. In Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, the defense industry comprised about fifteen percent of their heavy industry.

This distinction made the Soviet industry not merely an economic concern, but rather a central threat to international security. As Soviet central authority deteriorated, control over its massive military complex also crumbled. As such international security concerns are not limited to issues of control over nuclear weapons and material, but include attaining a degree of economic stability to offer stable employment to a vast number of persons in military and military-related occupations, especially scientists and engineers in that sector.

The threat was apparent; the risk of inadequate action has been readily apparent. The national interest, indeed,

the global interest, is in securing stability in the region. Stability in the region equates with global stability, especially in light of the potential leakage of knowhow from weapons complex.

Our approach has come in fits and starts. We have not offered a integrated, comprehensive plan for U.S. economic assistance or nonproliferation programs. Increasingly, however, we are coming to recognize the interrelationship between these two elements of our Russia policy, even if we still haven't achieved a semblance of a strategy.

I did, however, want to discuss some efforts that have succeeded. They are not sufficient in breadth, depth or financial means. Nonetheless, there are an exception to the rule in our efforts to provide meaningful, stable employment to former Soviet scientists and engineers.

I begin with the efforts of the Cooperative Research and Development Foundation, CRDF. CRDF was created pursuant to Section 511 of the Freedom Support Act of 1992 in 1995. Its mission is to conduct innovative activities of mutual benefit with the countries of the FSU. Further, CRDF was to offer opportunities to former weapons scientists to achieve transition to productive civilian research. They have been remarkably successful.

Since its inception, CRDF has expended \$16 million of U.S. Government funds and \$1 million from private foundations. The FSU, in turn, has committed \$4.8 million to these activities. These funds have backed 597 projects that supported a total of 4300 scientists and engineers.

In addition, with major contracts from the DOE, DoD, NIH, and EPA as well as industry, CRDF is helping U.S. participants address issues of financial integrity in their dealings with the FSU. Over \$30 million for over 500 projects has been managed by CRDF through these contracts.

The Foundation has committed an additional \$11.8 million to projects in five program areas.

CRDF's industry programs reduce the risk for U.S. companies to engage FSU scientists. These grants have leveraged 300 percent of U.S. Government funds through in cash and in-kind contributions from U.S. industry.

I would also note that more than 95 percent of the collaborations formed in CRDF awards will continue, whether with CRDF support or not. Over 100 U.S.-FSU teams are seeking commercial applications for the products of their collaborative research. Twenty-two teams have filed for patents, four of which are joint.

For over a year now CRDF has ensured financial integrity for Department of Energy projects under the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention, IPP, program. The United States In-

dustry Coalition, USIC, the industry-arm of the IPP program, now boasts 96 members throughout the U.S. and several substantial commercial successes with FSU partners. Through its cooperation with CRDF, USIC and the IPP program now can ensure that funding for FSU scientists involved in these research efforts avoids taxation by Russian or other officials. This aspect is critical for maximizing the impact of U.S. Government or industry investments to provide stable employment and a steady income to FSU scientists.

Since 1994, the IPP program has engaged over 6,200 former weapons of mass destruction scientists. Importantly, USIC members usually surpass cost-sharing arrangements with DOE expenditures totaling \$39.3 million versus the \$63.4 million invested by U.S. industry. Currently, 75 of USIC's members are engaged in 120 cost-shared projects.

I would like to briefly highlight a recent success story in my home state of New Mexico. On January 15, I participated in a technology demonstration and press conference to announce a \$20 million international investment in technologies jointly developed by a small U.S. engineering company, a Russian nuclear weapons plant, and two of the Department of Energy's facilities.

An entrepreneurial American company, Stolar Horizon of Raton, NM, a long-standing member of USIC, identified a Russian technology with market potential, then staked over \$5 Million of its own money to develop it. Stolar Horizon worked in tandem with Sandia National Laboratories and the Kansas City Plant through the IPP program to test and refine the technology for commercial, peaceful applications.

The result: Credit Suisse First Boston has committed \$20 million in financing to take the product to the global market. An estimated 350 new jobs will be created in New Mexico, and over 600 jobs await Russian nuclear scientists and technicians in Nizhny Novgorod at the Institute for Measuring Systems Research, NIIS, are planned.

I would remind everyone that U.S. appropriations in FY2001 for the IPP program is only \$24.5 million. In this one example, Credit Suisse will provide an investment equal to 80 percent of our own in this fiscal year.

The Stolar Horizon/NIIS success is a concrete example of the original IPP vision: making the world a safer place through cooperative commercial efforts leading to long-term, well-paying jobs in both nations.

The cooperative efforts of USIC members, DOE-IPP, other U.S. government agencies, and the scientific institutes of the NIS are revolutionizing the post-Cold War world, creating new opportunities for weapons scientists and engineers, and making our world more safe and secure.

I return to the thoughts of Charles Beard. In pursuit of its interests, Government might make use of citizens' interests to advance the national interest. This is the foremost objective of nonproliferation programs that seek to create commercial opportunities in the FSU.

The statistics and examples I've offered above underscore the successes we've achieved. Obviously, our attempts have frequently stumbled sometimes as a result of our own false starts and other times due to circumstances beyond our control. However, at the same time, we have never faced a situation similar to the collapse of the Soviet Union. We had never before legislated or formulated programs with the express intent of preventing proliferation through promotion of commercial opportunities. We had never confronted providing economic development aid to countries burdened by legacies of a command economy. From this perspective, we've made remarkable progress.

Mr. President, I would conclude on the following note: each concrete successful commercial venture will have exponential benefits. I am convinced that these ventures will pay off—by mitigating immediate potential proliferation threats, contributing to a stable economy in the region, and advancing U.S. citizens' own monetary interests.

#### CONGRATULATING FIRST BOOK

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, last Friday, Congressman MIKE CAPUANO and I had the honor of congratulating First Book for distributing over a quarter of a million books to children across Massachusetts. My distinguished colleague from Massachusetts is a tireless advocate for ensuring that children of all ages obtain the reading materials and skills they need to become active members of our State and of our Nation, and I am happy to have been able to share this important afternoon with him.

Thanks to the coordination of First Book, the generous donations by Random House Children's Books and Little, Brown & Company, and the dedicated volunteers from the Campus Outreach Opportunity League, the Coast Guard and First Book, thousands of children throughout our state who do not always get the opportunity to receive brand new books, are now enjoying their gifts.

First Book is making it possible for young children to have access to books and take the first steps toward learning to read and it is making a real difference in their lives. It is impressive that last year, First Book was responsible for distributing more than 4 million books to children in more than 290 communities across the country.

A 1999 evaluation of First Book conducted by Lou Harris and funded by the